Objectives: Anticholinesterases include carbamate and organophosphorus (OP) 
Introduction
Even before the Oklahoma City bombing and the release of the nerve agent sarin in Tokyo in 1995, the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, the attacks on the US embassies in 1998, and the World Trade Center attacks of2001, many hospitals recognized the consequences of failing to prepare for mass casualty incidents (MCls) of low probability but high impact'; however, the terrorist events of the 1990s and 2001 lent new urgency to disaster preparedness. 2 Despite the promulgation by the Joint Commission of standards for hospital emergency management,3 a 2003 report by the United States Governmental Accounting Office disclosed that most urban hospitals had developed emergency plans but had important terrorism-related deficiencies, especially in the areas of communication, training, drills, and equipment' Although public health agencies 5 and government programs· are vital for disaster response, hospital emergency departments (EDs) will bear the brunt of the initial challenges of a disaster, because most MCI survivors will either be transported to EDs or report to EDs on their own. 7 The American College
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of Emergency Physicians has urged emergency physicians to take active roles in hospital disaster preparedness, to communicate effectively before and during disasters, and to be prepared to triage scarce resources in disaster situations. s Challenges from potential disasters are particularly intimidating in the realm of unconventional mass casualty weapons (MCWs), the so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD): chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological releases·,lo Toxic chemicals" are not only an important subset of unconventional MCWS'2 but also represent a danger from the inappropriate use of commercially available compounds. 13 · ,6 One group of chemical compounds with a recognized potential for creating large numbers of casualties is anticholinesterase compounds, or cholinesterase inhibitors, which include carbamate and organophosphorus (OP) insecticides as well as the OP chemical warfare agents known as nerve agents.'7 These compounds inactivate the enzyme (acetylcholinesterase) responsible for the normal in vivo hydrolysis of the neurotransmitter acetylcholine after physiological endorgan activation; as a consequence, excessive cholinergic stimulation of end organs leads to hyperactivity and subsequent fatigue and failure of skeletal muscles as well as producing effects on smooth muscles and in exocrine glands and the central nervous system. The classic constellation of clinical findings from anticholinesterase poisoning is called the cholinergic toxidrome 17 and includes nicotinic receptor-mediated effects such as twitching, fasciculations, skeletal muscle weakness, and paralysis; and muscarinic receptormediated effects such as miosis, bronchospasm, hyperperistalsis, the production of copious secretions, seizures, and central apnea.'S,I. The inappropriate application of anticholinesterase pesticides or the intentional release of these pesticides or the even more potent nerve agents can generate large numbers of casualties, and the triage, diagnosis, decontamination, medical management, and disposition ofthese victims can overwhelm EDs, as illustrated by historical examples of OP-insecticide poisonings20-22 and the infamous release of the nerve agent sarin in the Tokyo subway system.'s,,, The observations that anticholinesterase poisonings are relatively rare in many community settings and that the clinical presentation of such poisonings may be atypical in special populations such as children" may make initial ED diagnosis difficult. A recent consequence analysis of a hypothetical indoor release of sarin confirmed mild effects within minutes of release, with serious injuries and fatalities beginning about 20 minutes after release. It also reinforced the importance of the key emergency response challenges of (a) time factors relating to the short latent period, (b) high casualty rates, and (c) contamination issues.'· Determining the level of hospital and ED preparedness for disaster preparedness is not an easy matter; as Burstein27 points out, tools designed to measure hospital preparedness exhibit high variability. Moreover, there is yet no universally accepted generic scoring system for disaster preparedness. 27 Nevertheless, surveys have evolved to become a popular, however flawed , means of attempting to assess the preparedness of hospitals and EDs for disasters, including chemical MCIs. Keim et aI! S used a survey to investigate preparedness for chemical terrorism between 1996 and 2000 in a major US city and concluded that the hospitals studied were poorly prepared to manage chemical emergency incidents, including terrorism. A pre-9/11 survey of224 hospital EDs in four northwestern states found that EDs "generally [were] not prepared in an organized fashion to treat victims of chemical or biological terrorism,"'· and a smaller, contemporary, interview-type survey of hospital personnel in 30 hospitals revealed that 73 percent felt unprepared to handle a chemical weapons incident despite training being provided to nearly one-fourth of the participants. so WMD preparedness had been incorporated into hospital disaster plans in 27 percent of facilities. In 2003, a National Hospital Ambulatory Medical Care Survey found that although 85.5 percent of the approximately 500 US hospitals surveyed had plans for responding to chemical disasters, only 46.1 percent reported written agreements with other facilities; the survey also showed that drills for natural disasters occurred more frequently than for chemical events 3 1 In 2002, Greenberg et aJ.32 published the results of a 38-question questionnaire mailed to physician ED directors in the greater Philadelphia area to assess their preparedness for chemical and biological terrorism; this survey disclosed deficiencies in written policies, interagency agreements, training and education, decontamination facilities, and antidote availability in the surveyed EDs. In the study by Greenberg et ai., although two-thirds ofEDs (66.7 percent) had written policies for dealing specifically with chemical and biological casualties and 59.2 percent ofEDs had chemical agent-or biological agent-related drills in the preceding 3 years, 61.1 percent of respondents were unaware of any written policy for contacting governmental agencies in the event of a chemical or biological MCI, and 61.1 percent believed that hospital supplies of antidotes for these events were inadequate. Two British surveys from this period uncovered similar problems in the United Kingdom. 33 ,34 Later surveys""" demonstrated continuing deficiencies in hospital and ED response in the US cities.
No study has specifically investigated the preparedness of EDs for MCls involving the release of anticholinesterases. The hypothesis of this study was that despite the focus of disaster preparedness on large metropolitan areas, EDs in such cities would still report perceived deficiencies in preparedness for disasters, especially those in which large-scale releases of anticholinesterases might occur. The expectation was also that a survey ofthis kind could identify particular deficiencies amenable to changes in administrative or clinical policy, thus guiding remedial actions.
Methods
It was decided to survey physician directors of EDs in the 12 largest cities in the United States, and the US Census Bureau was consulted to obtain a list of the 12 largest incorporated cities in the United States as of (Table I) ."' To be considered for inclusion in this survey, an ED needed to be located in one of these 12 cities, to be staffed 24 hours a day, and to have a physician director.
The initial survey questionnaire included an introductory demographics section and 60 nondemographic 
Results
Despite repeated attempts, E·mail invitations to 46 of the physician ED directors were returned as undeliverable, and additional attempts to reach these directors were unsuccessful. Of the remaining 174 directors, eight (4.6 percent) declined to fill out the survey and 89 (51.1 percent) took the survey. All 89 respondents answered all of the initial demographic questions, and 85 proceeded to the non demographic questions; 80 directors answered all 30 ofthe nonde· mographic questions. Table 2 gives the demographics of the responding hospitals. New York City, with 29 respondents, repre· sented 32.6 percent of the total. Nearly half of the responding hospitals had 101·300 beds, and hospitals with 301·500 beds and with more than 500 beds each represented about a quarter of the total. Three·quarters ofEDs had more than 20 beds; none had 10 or fewer. EDs with between 30,000 and 60,000 patient encounters per year represented 42.7 percent of the total, and 18 percent had more than 100,000 visits annually. The responses to the five questions (questions 6-10) about decontamination, detection, and PPE are given in Table 4 , which shows that 94.0 percent (79/84) of reporting EDs had decontamination facilities for chemically contaminated patients. The estimated rapidity of chemical decontamination for reporting facilities varied as follows: 13.1 percent (11/84) of respondents reported being able to decontaminate more than 50 patients per hour, whereas nearly onethird (32.1 percent [27/84] 30 .5 percent (25/82) answering that they had participated in this kind of a drill within the past 3 years. To the question that asked specifically about the frequency of these drills, 28.0 percent (23182) answered that they had never taken part in such a drill; in response to the next question, which asked about the effects of the drills, 19.5 percent (16/82) reported never having participated in an anticholinesterase-related drill. Only 4.9 percent (4/82) of ED directors were very confident that their drill experiences had prepared them for a real MCI, and more than half(51.2 percent [42182]) were either not confident at all or only slightly confident in the effectiveness of their drills. Table 6 reports the results from the four-question section (questions 15-18) about capacity and staffing. Almost two-fifths (39.0 percent [32182]) of respondents estimated that they would be able to triage between 20 and 50 incoming patients in an anticholinesteraserelated MCI; at the extremes, 14.6 percent (12182) felt incapable of triaging 10 or more per hour, whereas 11.0 percent (9/82) answered that they could triage more than 50 per hour. Rates for evaluating and treating such patients were lower: 24.4 percent (20/82) thought that they could not handle 10 or more patients an hour, and only 4.9 percent (4/82) felt confident that they could evaluate and treat more than Comments: Four comments, including "Given how rare these events are, I think there would be chaos with initial communications" and "By routine communications! Very poorly."
'Because a few respondents skipped these questions, total number of recipients per question may be less than the number who took the survey. (15/82) wanted to use CHEMPACKlDSNS both as the primary source of antidotes and also as a resupply. The single highest percentage response for each of the questions regarding the number of severely exposed patients able to be treated with antidotes already on hand in reporting hospitals was "I don't know"; the next more frequent response was the fewer-than-10-patients option. The benzodiaiepine of choice for most ED directors in treating anticholinesterase-induced seizures was lorazepam (42.7 percent [35/82] Respondents were given the opportunity not only to provide comments on individual questions but also to leave comments on the survey as a whole. These general comments are given in Table 9 .
Discussion
This survey illustrates several deficiencies in the preparedness of EDs in major US metropolitan areas to manage MCIs involving the release of anticholinesterase compounds (carbamate insecticides, OP insecticides, or nerve agents).
Several reports have underscored the importance of so-called all-hazard hospital disaster plans that are nevertheless based on specific hazard-vulnerability analysis (not addressed in this 30-question survey) and that can be adapted to specific threats such as chemical releases.4()·43 Previous surveys have shown that the development of written plans is one of the first administrative actions in preparing for a disaster, and all respondents in this survey reported the existence of disaster plans at their hospitals. This survey did not attempt to Comments: Four comments: "1 don't know quantity," "The watch commander for NYC OEM has a low threashold [sic] for releasing CHEMPACK to the surrounding hospitals if an event is suspected based on radio traffic monitoring. The first indication the hospital may have that an event may occur is the delivery of the CHEMPACK," "Not sure where," and "We have Mark 1 kits."
How does your ED plan to use CHEMPACKlDSNS in a mass casualty incident involving anticholinesterases?
As the primary source of antidotes for patients 8.5 (7)
As a resupply for antidotes already available in the hospital 29.3 (24) Both as the primary source of antidotes and also as a resupply 18.3 (15) My ED does not plan to use either in such an incident. 
(23)
I don't know.
(2)
·Because a few respondents skipped these questions, total numbers of recipients per question may be less than the number who took the survey. 
Other resources
(26)
I do not anticipate using resources outside my ED.
(2)
Comments: Three comments: "Bio-terrorism regional network," "PharmD with special interest in Tax is 0. Decontamination is one of the crucial components of immediate prehospital and ED care of a victim with ingestion or skin exposure to anticholinesterases. I 6.51 Skin decontamination is particularly important not only to protect hospital facilities and healthcare workers21.22.S2 but also because any liquid still in contact with the skin of a casualty has the potential of being converted from an external to an internal dose. Moreover, chemical agents on the skin must be removed as soon as possible before significant skin penetration can occur, as compounds that have begun to penetrate the skin are not normally susceptible to surface decontamination. 53 The perception by 32.1 percent of ED directors that their EDs would not be able to decontaminate 10 or more patients per hour is thus particularly distressing. Related causes for concern from this survey are the observations that only a quarter of respondents reported readily available chemical detectors (vital in assuring that no liquid decontamination remains on the skin of victims) and that only 14.3 percent were very familiar with OSHA Best
Practices for Hospital-Based First Receivers of Victims from Mass Casualty Incidents Involving the Release of
Hazardous Substances,39 a foundational report that sets out important guiding principles for decontamination of chemical casualties. Several recommendations· 6 "'. 5S exist for improving the capability of EDs to decontaminate victims of chemical MCIs, and remediation of this deficiency should be pursued aggressively.
It is a given that all emergency physicians must receive adequate preparatory and continuing didactic education and must also learn and practice skills such as advanced cardiac life support in intensive simulations or drills. Such training and practice are reinforced by daily encounters with real patients in EDs. This kind of daily reinforcement is lacking for lowprobability but high-impact events such as chemical MCls, making the issues of training and drilling even more important in preparation for chemical disasters" despite the lack of a widespread standardized curriculum for training emergency medicine residents in disaster medicine 57 and the widespread perception that emergency-preparedness training is not a high priority in many areas. 58 The fact that 70.8 percent of respondents in this survey had had at least 1 hour of formal didactic training about anticholinesterases within the preceding 3 years is a step in the right direction, but the quality of the training can be surmised from the related finding that only 18.3 percent of ED directors thought that their training had equipped them to respond adequately to an imminent large-scale release of an anticholinesterase compound. Disaster drills that included anticholinesterases were even less frequently reported, and only 4.9 percent of respondents reported that their participation in drills had made them very confident of their ability to respond to a real MCI of this nature. Several plans for education and drilling exist 57 • 59 . 64 and include the organization of a trained and dedicated response team,6S an intensive three-hour course,66 the National Training Strategy,58.67 and an integrated disaster medicine continuing education program 66 ; the findings of this section of the current survey strongly argue for increased emphasis on adopting one or more of these proposals.
Rapid triage and treatment of patients after the release oflarge quantities of anticholinesterase compounds is complicated by the fact that EDs are likely to be flooded with individuals who think that they may have been exposed and who in fact may exhibit psychological effects mimicking those of anticholinesterase intoxication while also being delayed in their presentation of clinical signs and symptoms of actual poisoning. G9 . 7o Nearly one-sixth ofrespondents (14.6 percent) thought that their EDs could triage fewer than 10 patients per hour, although it is encouraging that 57.3 percent anticipated being able to triage 20 or more patients per hour. Capacity markedly decreased for the questions concerning the treatment of severely exposed patients, particularly apneic patients; however, this finding was expected. 7I • 73 Anticipations of receiving needed additional staff were relatively high in this survey. Innovative methods of increasing the rate of triage and treatment of chemical casualties have been reported 7 .-77 and should be investigated seriously in this regard. Augmenting the capability of managing ventilator-dependent anticholinesterase casualties has also been studied 7 8-00 and shown to be feasible.
The choice and availability of pharmaceuticals (atropine, 2-pralidoximine chloride, and benzodiazepines) is one of the most anxiety-producing aspects of preparing for anticholinesterase mass casualties. 8 ' The DSNS was established to help replenish antidotes used by a hospital during an anticholinesterase MCI.82 The realization that most such casualties would need treatment before 12-hour push packages from strategically positioned DSNS stockpile sites around the country would be likely to be delivered prompted the expansion of the national stockpile in 2003 to include the CHEMPACK program for prepositioning of initial stockpiles of antidotes directly at hospitals. 83 . 85 The finding that 23.2 percent of physician ED directors had not heard ofDSNS and that 37.8 percent had not heard of CHEMPACK is thus alarming, as is the observation that nearly half of the directors were not sure how their EDs would use CHEMPACKI DSNS. It could be argued that this responsibility rests with hospital pharmacists, but in fact ED physicians need to be actively involved with hospital pharmacies in assessing hospital stockpiles of anticholinesterase antidotes and what would be needed in a mass casualty event. This survey demonstrates not only that many ED directors do not have an understanding ofthe roles that prepositioning and resupply of these antidotes would play in a chemical MCI but also that they are unable to estimate how many anticholinesterase casualties could be treated with antidotes on hand in their hospitsIs. The expressed preference of ED directors for benzodiazepines other than midazolam is interesting in view of recent evidence that in the setting of intramuscular administration, and probably via the intravenous route as well, midazolam may be superior to other benzodiazepines, particularly lorazepam (the most popular choice among respondents in this survey), in the prevention and management ofOP-induced seizures. 86 . 91 The results of this section of the survey should be of inunense interest to the DSNS and to other governmental agencies tasked with MCI antidotal recommendations for hospitsI EDs.
Knowing when to seek additional resources and where to go to find them is an important skill for all emergency physicians. 92 This ability to seek and find relevant information resources is paramount when EDs are flooded with patients with the possible diagnosis of anticholinesterase exposure. 93 It is thus encouraging that only 2.5 percent of respondents in this survey did not expect to use any resources outside their www.disastermedicinejournal.com EDs in such an event. Access to a board-certified medical toxicologist would be ideal, but only 45.7 percent of respondents reported ready availability of a medical toxicologist directly employed by or affiliated with their hospitals. This finding by itself speaks to the need for more board-certified medical toxicologists in major medical centers. The most accessible reported resource (96.1 percent) was that of a local poison control center. Poison control centers have already been discussed as information resources for volunteer EMSs in cases of suspected chemical exposures 94 ; this survey suggests that poison control centers also need to recognize the widespread dependence ofEDs on poison center expertise in anticholinesterase MCls and to ensure that communications between them and hospital EDs are not overwhelmed during such an incident. Telemedicine is another potential resource in a chemical emergency95 but was not specifically addressed in this survey, although 32.1 percent of respondents expected to use resources either instead of or in addition to medical toxicologists, poison control centers, and the Internet. Online resources are likely to playa major role for clinicians in MCIs involving unfamiliar agents, just as they already serve an important function in other kinds of disasters.96 One particularly useful resource for radiological or nuclear MCIs is REMM, an Internet-based but also downloadable and mobile information program from the National Library of Medicine (NLM) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH).97,98The observation that 39.5 percent of ED directors had never heard ofREMM should be of interest to those at the NLM and NIH who have developed and who continue to revise and update this program and suggests that outreach for this excellent resource needs to continue. Nearly half ofthe respondents (48.1 percent)-and nearly two thirds (73.6 percent) of those familiar with REMM-felt that a chemical counterpart to REMM would be moderately to very useful in managing mass casualties from anticholinesterase exposure; this should provide added impetus to the ongoing development by NLM and NIH of the nascent program CHEMM (Chemical Hazard Emergency Medical Management).
An obvious limitstion of this survey is the relatively low response rate. Of the 174 physician ED directors 4. "Thank you for the survey, it really facilitates a drill we will be having in considering our upcoming needs." who presumably received E-mail invitations, only 51.1 percent (89) began the survey and only 48.9 percent (84) proceeded beyond the introductory demographic questions. Only 4.6 percent (8) formally declined to take the survey; the reasons behind the silence of the remaining ED directors despite repeated and apparently received E-mail invitations are unclear. The survey was specifically created according to published guidelines for survey design,99 and although more information from fewer participants might have resulted from the original 60· question instrument, it was decided to restrict the num· ber of nondemographic questions to a total of 30. It was hypothesized that with the choice of an easily completed online survey and the clear explanation that only 30 questions would be required and that the total time required to fill out the survey should not exceed approximately 15 minutes, the response rate would be higher than for traditionally mailed surveys; this proved not to be the case. There was only a slight rise in unanswered questions near the end of the survey, suggesting that although a degree of "question fatigue" may have existed, it was not significant for those who actually took the survey. There is no way of knowing whether or to what extent nonrespondents may have differed from respondents in their perceptions of ED preparedness. However, this apparent limitation may also be a major finding of the study. ForlWhatever reason, physician ED directors in major US cities may in general be so overwhelmed by daily activities or, alternatively, by misgivings about preparedness for chemical MCls that they are unlikely to respond to a survey instrument of this type. There is evidence loo that surveys, drill observation using a structured evaluation tool, and video analyses of team performance during drills may measure distinct aspects of disaster preparedness, and therefore future studies may need to emphasize a nonsurvey type of data collection. Of course, an inherent limitation of survey instruments is that perceptions, however firmly held, may not reflect the actual state of disaster preparedness, as after-action reports of disaster exercises and actual MCls have demonstrated.
Another significant finding of this study was the observation that despite advances in technology since the 2002 Philadelphia surveyS2 for which it proved impossible to find a reliable directory of ED physicians, such a directory remains elusive. The implications of this finding extend beyond the logistics of delivering a survey instrument: In a real MCI, it may be important to disseminate information quickly to ED directors. Without an available and reliable contact list of such directors, crucial data may not find its way to these directors in a timely fashion.
In 2002, Greenberg"2 proposed criteria (Table 10) for minimal preparedness for a hospital ED to evaluate and treat victims of biological or chemical agent release. Although those criteria could be expanded to address other issues such as triage and are not in every case applicable to the current study, 32 .1 percent of the respondents in this survey would have failed criterion 2 (the ability to decontaminate at least 10 patients per hour) and 92.7 percent would have failed a modification of criterion 5 (participation within the preceding 12 months in a disaster drill specifically addressing anticholinesterases).
This study, the first survey in the literature with a focus on ED preparedness for MCls involving anticholinesterases, demonstrates that physician ED directors in major US cities recognize several deficiencies in their ability to respond to such events. The survey findings point out specific deficiencies amenable to remediation and emphasize directions for further research and for policy actions to correct these deficiencies. The conclusion given by Farmer and Carlton in 2002 is just as valid today as it was then: "The potential impact of a i - To Pen
